5. Truth
A New Dynamism for Philosophy
Chapter 5. Truth
Key Questions.
- What is truth?
- Why do correspondence, coherence and pragmatic theories of truth fail?
- Can we dispense altogether with truth as a concept?
- How should we appraise the merits of alternative conceptual schemes that claim to be true representations of reality?
- What distinguishes necessary from contingent truths?
- How does a definition offer a true and an informative description of a concept?
- What sort of things are numbers?
- Do the truths of mathematics form a separate class?
- How can mathematics guide and inform our investigation of reality?
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Summary of Conclusions: Truth
Confusion over the concept of truth is due to a failure to understand the relationship between language and reality. Correspondence and coherence theories of truth fail because they trivialise the relationship to the extent that reality is not allowed to be more than the instantiation of a set of concepts.
Unsurprisingly then they play down the significance of truth as a concept. Pragmatic theories Presume and rely upon a measure of truth in reality in order for expediency and success there to be recognisable.
A range of attitudes impels our pronouncements on reality depending upon circumstances and motives. Some of the most important attitudes produce statements. Truth typically obtains when a statement from one side, and the conclusion of an inquiry or investigation from the other, converge upon the same fact.
Attitudes such as belief may correspond with a factual state of reality, but knowledge cannot presume a correspondence with the fact it expresses. With its truth ascertained, a statement of knowledge forges a non- contingent link with a fact that renders correspondence trivial. Truth is a significant concept because knowledge is.
Other concepts can cover for the roles that truth plays, but its importance is undiminished for that. The representation of truth as encapsulated in enclosed conceptual schemes or paradigms derives much of its force from a distorted historical narrative. It plays down the characteristically smooth and continuous progress of the bulk of research, and exaggerates the disruption caused by radical new proposals.
Concept-based theories need such a narrative to support their philosophical position, but actual events do not supply this and their position is unsustainable in any event. Paradigms or orthodoxies nonetheless form an important part of our culture and the attitudes that spawn them are not incompatible with truth.
To qualify as true representations, they must withstand investigation. Science covers the most formal and rigorous application of investigative techniques and good science is the paradigm for all investigative enquiry.
Statements about concepts produce necessary truths. Practical considerations and decisions may be involved in setting concept boundaries and in determining the necessary truths that result. Statements about concepts in which one includes or is equivalent to another may be termed analytic.
Synthetic truths about concepts result from contingent associations between concepts that overlap and can be used to make more informative definitions. Each instance of truth is a result or conclusion obtainable from investigation, inference or other means.
Each is an example of the concept of truth that is unique and indivisible, so Truth itself possesses only essential attributes. Operations upon truth-values are valid where they produce propositions that are either true or false under all combinations of truth-values.
Numbers are concepts obtainable from calculations of equal quantity. Statements about numbers are necessarily true and these may be synthetic and informative in the way that some definitions can be, and so inform our investigation of reality.