4. Meaning
A New Dynamism for Philosophy
Chapter 4. Meaning
Key Questions:
- What is meaning?
- What is the basic unit of meaning upon which language is built?
- Does the later Wittgenstein’s influential linguistic approach to philosophy make a broader range of philosophical insights accessible?
- How do we locate the meaning of concepts, and how do they specify references in reality?
- How do common nouns and proper nouns differ?
- How do statements about concepts differ from statements about objects and their properties in reality?
- What is the relationship between an object and its properties?
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Summary of Conclusions: Meaning
Linguistic philosophy implies too close an association between the meaning and reference of a concept. It depends excessively upon the ready-made distinctions and classifications within a language, and lacks the means of explaining their presence there.
Linguistic and concept–based philosophy too emphatically draws attention to different conceptual systems and the diverse perspectives they represent. The distinctive cultural outlook each embodies is misleadingly used to cast doubt on the wisdom of seeking a common focus for them in reality.
Dynamism locates meaning in social interaction and the agendas that conscious beings pursue. It reverses the Wittgensteinian position and suggests that the use of a word is a consequence of its meaning rather than its source. So conceived language use can be understood as taking place within reality rather than limiting and controlling our access to it.
Linguistic and concept based theories offer no account of a shared reality and hold no prospect for a mutual understanding of different perspectives. Dynamism asserts that a common reference is necessary in order for diverse perspectives to be distinguishable and shows how this may be achieved.
For dynamism, concepts are our means of gaining access to reality.
They are the exclusive prerogative of conscious beings, and represent in a general fashion the scope and direction of an interest in reality. Related to this generality is the flexibility of the demands we place there.
Properties are one means of characterising the variation in objects that the flexibility of concepts will tolerate. Objects are more fundamental than properties and cannot be exclusively built from them. The manner in which we divide up reality between properties, processes and objects depends in part upon the sort of society we live in and the way of life that our environment sustains.
Language generates a great number of both unique references and shades of meaning, whilst working within a manageable vocabulary. Combining concepts and locating them in space and time is one means of narrowing generalisations to secure a unique reference.
A proper noun also secures a unique reference. It does not have the same meaning as a uniquely referring expression that refers to the same thing. The same reference is the result of contingent associations between the two.
Sentences about concepts can state “essential” truths because they refer to every possible instance of the concept. An object stripped of its essential properties assumes a generality corresponding to the concept that defines it. This is its nominal essence.
The separation of meaning and essence on the one side, and the reference or particular on the other, allows dynamism to embrace or tolerate change, ambiguity or vagueness in concepts without requiring the same of their objects.
The sentence is the basic unit or building block of meaning and is principally used to effect an action. Words exist to expedite language use, but depend upon the sentence to lend them meaning.