2. Self and Others
A New Dynamism for Philosophy.
Chapter 2. Self and Others.
Key Questions.
- What is the individual self or ego and why does it feature so prominently in Western philosophy?
- How are mind and body related, and can they interact?
- Could computers be conscious and possess minds?
- In what sense are our experiences private and exclusive?
- How is self- consciousness possible?
- Wherein lies our uniqueness or individuality?
- How can diverse experiences form an integrated whole belonging to one individual?
- Is it possible for the unique experiences of an individual to become the shared experiences necessary for communication?
- How can the asymmetry formed between the internal view of ourselves and the external views of others be integrated as aspects of one individual person?
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Summary of Conclusions.
The key to understanding ourselves lies in ownership. Each of us is an organising and appropriating presence that seeks to impose an agenda upon reality. The self operates at two levels within this relationship: those of the general and the individual self.
Our general self manifests itself in all conscious activity, and can proceed without recognizing others. At this fundamental level our general subjectivity supplies the platform upon which our individual subjectivity is built.
The individual self operates within and is represented by constraints on the operation of the general self in its encounters with those pursuing alternative agendas. A crucial consequence of operating at two levels is an asymmetry between the first person witness of our own personal experiences and the third person witness of the lives of others.
Our own operations are experienced at both general and individual levels, but any interaction with others takes place only at the individual level. The individual ownership of mind and body can only be claimed through or within the operations of the general self. So the asymmetry demarcates a general ownership of ourselves that is non-transferable.
The unity and the continuity of the self are assured within this framework. Consciousness represents a flexibility and adaptability in pursuing an agenda that is possible for creatures possessing the central nervous system capable of coordinated movement. The self possesses a mind by dint of its capacity for consciousness.
This is missing from computers and other inanimate forms. Although capable of prodigious feats, computers lack the emotional life necessary for the creativity and flexibility that generate the impetus and concepts characteristic of conscious life.
The body is the non-transferable instrument of a living agenda and features in experiences of the self at both general and individual levels. Mind and body enjoy a degree of independence represented by the extent to which the self is able to control the body and invest its operations with purpose.
There is scope for different types of causal explanations to complement our understanding of the mind and body, but we cannot rely exclusively upon explanations of this type. Privacy attaches to experiences to the extent that we are able to conceal their manifestations. It is not an essential feature that we need appeal to in order to explain their non-transferability.
The exclusive control of a mind and body provides this explanation. Dynamism does not need to seek a convergence of individual perspectives in order that shared experiences and a language describing them can develop.
Individuality characterises a divergence of perspectives that differences in personal circumstances or other conditions can locate. Self-consciousness represents a consciousness of the self operating at the individual level of consciousness. It is to be aware of the individuality of one’s own perspective.